

29 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Proposed Reorganization of the U.S. Pacification Effort

1. On your behalf, I represented the Agency at the 29 March State-JCS meeting, which constituted Ambassador Bunker's and Ambassador Locke's first formal session with the Joint Chiefs since their Saigon assignments were announced. All the Chiefs were present save the Marine Commandant, General Greene, who was represented by a three-star alternate whose name I did not get. State was represented by Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke and Under-Secretary Foy Kohler.
2. Ambassador Bunker asked that General Wheeler and his colleagues open the meeting by raising any questions or problems on their minds or points to which they felt his (Bunker's) and Ambassador Locke's attention should be directed. Wheeler first talked about Cambodia, then raised the matter of the organization of the U.S. pacification effort.
3. From the ensuing exchange of remarks, it was evident that the question of pacification organization had been discussed at Guam in some private session which neither of us attended. (Bunker specifically referred to such a Guam discussion without elaborating on its content. Wheeler nodded in a manner that indicated he knew of, or had participated in, the session in question.) Apparently, the Guam discussion resulted in a proposal -- or agreement -- that the U.S. pacification effort should be placed under General Westmoreland's overall direction with Komer running the civil side of pacification and reporting to Westmoreland (not directly to Bunker or Locke). I am inferring that this is what was agreed at Guam from the remarks Bunker made, which did not spell out any details and, hence, were rather cryptic to someone not privy to the background apparently shared by Bunker and Wheeler.


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4. Bunker did say that "yesterday" (i.e., 28 March) a memo had been forwarded -- presumably to the President -- by Rostow's office, recommending adoption of "the organization discussed in Guam." Bunker said that Komer had discussed these organizational arrangements with Westmoreland in Saigon (where Komer went when the Guam Conference broke up) and the (28 March) memo out of Rostow's office was largely based on these Komer-Westmoreland discussions. Bunker also said that the President had decided to "reserve his decision" on these organizational changes, at least for the time being.*

5. Komer called me shortly before I left for the State-JCS meeting to talk about some Chieu Hoi statistics. I asked him what his travel plans were. He said he did not know, since they were not firm and would be determined by Ambassador Bunker's (sic) as yet unexpressed wishes. He said not one word about any reorganization of pacification. In fact, when I asked him about the New York Times story re General Abrams (the Times suggested that Abrams, now visiting in Saigon, was going to take over pacification prior to becoming Westmoreland's successor), Komer replied that this was nonsense and no major changes, other than those already announced, were in the wind.

6. As I indicated in our telephone conversation, I am not advocating that we fight the problem if yet another reorganization of the U.S. pacification effort is indeed in the wind. I do feel strongly, however, that in light of the Agency's manpower, budgetary and logistic resources now committed to the pacification effort -- resources whose disposition and control will inevitably be affected by any major command relationship changes -- we have every right to know precisely what is in the wind or under active consideration. I also believe that in our own interests we ought to find out what is being planned or considered in order to discover just how our interests, responsibilities and authority would be affected.

7. Since this matter of pacification reorganization was raised and mention of the 28 March "Rostow memo" made at a formal gathering to which you were officially invited and at which you were officially represented, it seems to me that it would be perfectly in order for you to call Rostow and ask him what is up.


George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

* Mr. FitzGerald confirmed with Mr. Rostow on 29 March that the President has decided to make no decision now on this proposal.

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee 29Mar67 (Note added per Mr. Helms 30Mar67)

Orig -

1 - Mr

1 - Mr. FitzGerald

1 - Mr. Colby

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1 - Pacification Reorganization file

1 - GAC Chrono ✓

1 - VAS Chrono

1 - DCI Special Projects

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The Director

GACarver

Dissemination of Memorandum

I have made copies of the attached for
FitzGerald, Colby and [] but instructed
George Allen and [] not to forward
them until you approve their being sent.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment